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INTRODUCTION
“Can you spare some change?” To a listener, these words of
solicitation can be an annoyance, but to the speaker, these words are a
plea for help and a means of survival. In September of 2014, the
Seventh Circuit upheld a Springfield ordinance that prohibited oral
solicitations for money in Springfield’s downtown historic area.1 This
Seventh Circuit decision is the latest in a string of decisions from the
federal circuits on whether regulations on panhandling, like the one in
Springfield, are constitutional under the First Amendment.2
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that
Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”3
Scholars, judges, and practitioners have found that free speech is
 J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., Communication Studies and Environmental Studies, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007.
1
Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2014).
2
See Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014); Clatterbuck v.
City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2013); Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d
867 (6th Cir. 2013).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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essential to the preservation of democracy, the marketplace of ideas, a
person’s sense of “personhood and autonomy,” and promoting
tolerance in society.4 Although there are some types of speech that fall
outside the protections of the First Amendment,5 charitable
solicitations are a type of speech protected under the First
Amendment.6
When government makes a restriction on speech that is
protected by the First Amendment, the restriction is either contentbased or content-neutral. If a government regulation restricts speech
because of “its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content,”
the government’s regulation is a content-based restriction.7 Contentbased speech restrictions are analyzed under strict scrutiny review,
which means that for the restriction to be valid, the government must
show that the restriction serves a compelling governmental interest
that is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.8 On the other hand, a
speech restriction is content-neutral when the government regulates
the manner in which speech may be communicated, regardless of the
message conveyed.9 Content-neutral speech restrictions are analyzed
under intermediate scrutiny review, which means that for the
restriction to be valid, the government must prove that the restriction
serves a significant governmental interest and leaves open alternative
channels of communicating the restricted speech.10
4

Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1208-12 (3d ed. 2009)
(explaining several reasons why free speech is important, including Alexander
Mikeljohn’s idea that free speech preserves democracy; Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ idea that free speech contributes to the marketplace of ideas; Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s idea that free speech is central to one’s “personhood and
autonomy”; and Professor Lee Bollinger’s idea that free speech promotes tolerance).
5
See Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding that
the First Amendment does not protect speech involving obscenity, fraudulent
misrepresentation, defamation, or fighting words).
6
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
7
Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
8
Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
9
Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1537.
10
Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Av. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
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Other factors play into the analysis of a speech restriction. One
significant factor is whether the restriction takes place in a public
forum.11 A public forum is a place, such as a sidewalk or public park,
that government is “obligated to make available for speech.”12 When a
content-based speech restriction takes place in a public forum, the
restriction is analyzed under strict scrutiny just like it would be in a
non-public forum.13 However, when a content-neutral speech
restriction takes place in a public forum, the speech restriction is
analyzed more rigorously than if it took place in a non-public forum.
Regulations that restrict speech in a public forum may only restrict
speech according to the time, place, and manner in which the speech is
delivered.14 The regulation also must be narrowly tailored to restrict
no more speech than necessary.15 Because content-neutral restrictions
of speech in public forums require a more rigorous standard of review,
the determination of whether a restriction on speech takes place in a
public forum and whether the restriction is content-based or contentneutral has significant effect on the restriction’s constitutionality.
In Norton, the Seventh Circuit held that Springfield’s
ordinance prohibiting panhandling in its historic downtown area was a
content-neutral speech restriction.16 As a content-neutral restriction,
the Seventh Circuit found that the ordinance was constitutional.17
However, this Seventh Circuit decision is out of step with the federal
circuit courts that have reviewed similar panhandling regulations.
Part I of this article explores the Supreme Court’s framework
for analyzing cases involving solicitations. Then, Part II explores how
the federal circuits have applied the Supreme Court’s analyses in
solicitation cases to panhandling restrictions. Part III discusses the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Norton. Finally, Part IV argues that the
Seventh Circuit misapplied the law and departed from the Supreme
11

Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1537.
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2014).
17
Id. at 717.
12
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Court’s framework and sister circuits in holding that the ordinance was
content-neutral and valid under the First Amendment.
I. SUPREME COURT CASES ON SOLICITATION RESTRICTIONS
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality
of panhandling restrictions, but the Court has ruled on several cases
dealing with solicitations in general. In these cases, the Court’s
determination of two factors played a significant role in the outcomes
of the cases: (1) whether the forum was considered a public forum and
(2) whether the restriction was a content-based or content-neutral
speech restriction.
In 1980, the Supreme Court held in Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, that charitable solicitation is a form
of speech protected by the First Amendment.18 In that case, the
Supreme Court reviewed a municipal ordinance that required
charitable organizations that solicited funds by door-to-door
solicitations or by use of public streets to apply for a permit.19 A fine
of up to $500 per offense was the punishment for charitable
organizations that solicited contributions without obtaining a permit.20
In granting these permits for charitable solicitations, the organizations
must prove that at least 75 percent of the proceeds of their solicitations
were used directly for the charitable purpose of the organization.21 The
ordinance explicitly stated that funds used for salaries or commissions
for solicitors or used for administrative expenses of the organization
could not be included as funds used for charitable purposes of the
organization.22
Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), an Illinois not-forprofit corporation, applied for a permit to solicit contributions.23 The
village of Schaumberg denied CBE a permit because CBE could not
18

Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
Id. at 622-23.
20
Id. at 623.
21
Id. at 624.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 624-25.
19
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demonstrate that 75 percent of their solicitations would be used for
charitable purposes as defined by the ordinance.24 CBE sued for
injunctive and declaratory relief claiming that the ordinance violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.25
The Court, citing a string of cases, found that the First
Amendment protects charitable solicitations because they “involve a
variety of speech interests—communication of information, the
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy
of causes—that are within the protection of the First Amendment.”26
Finding that charitable solicitations are protected speech, the Court
went on to consider whether the ordinance’s requirement that 75
percent of the solicitations must be used for charitable purposes was a
valid restriction on CBE’s protected speech.27 The Court held that the
75 percent requirement did not serve a sufficiently important
governmental interest.28 Although the Village had an interest in
protecting the public from fraud, crime, and undue annoyance, the
Court found that the 75 percent requirement unnecessarily interfered
with First Amendment freedoms of charitable organizations that used
solicited funds to primarily engage in research, advocacy, or public
education.29 The Court also noted that broad rules in the area of free
expression are suspect.30
The village of Schaumburg decision is important in two
respects. First, the Court found that the First Amendment protects
charitable solicitations.31 Second, although the court did not specify
whether the ordinance in the village of Schaumburg was a contentbased or content-neutral speech restriction, the Court established that
speech restrictions cannot be overly broad and must be substantially
related to the governmental interest.32
24

Id. at 625.
Id.
26
Id. at 632.
27
Id. at 636.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 636-37.
30
Id. at 637.
31
Id. at 632.
32
Id. at 636-37.
25
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One year after striking down the ordinance in Village of
Schaumburg, the Court in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., upheld a Minnesota State Fair regulation
requiring that “all persons, groups, or firms which desire to sell,
exhibit, or distribute materials during the annual State Fair must do so
only from fixed locations on the fairgrounds.”33 In that case, the
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON)
sought for injunctive relief to prohibit the regulation’s enforcement
against ISKCON members. ISKCON claimed that the regulation
violated its members’ First Amendment rights because it suppressed
their ability to practice Sankirtan, a religious ritual wherein members
distribute or sell religious literature, and to solicit donations for the
religion in public places.34
In analyzing ISKCON’s claim, the Court first noted that the
First Amendment “does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s
views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”35
The Court further stated that speech restrictions are upheld when the
restriction (1) is justified without reference to the content of the
speech, (2) serves a significant governmental interest, and (3) leaves
open alternative channels for communicating the regulated speech.36
The Court first held that the regulation requiring that all distribution
and sales of materials take place from fixed locations on the
fairgrounds was not based on the content of the speech, and thus, it
was a content-neutral restriction.37 The regulation was not open to the
kind of arbitrary application consistent with content-based restrictions
that have “the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a
particular point of view.” 38 Instead, the State Fair’s method of
allocating booths and other fixed locations on the fairground was a
straightforward first-come, first-served system, and the regulation

33

452 U.S. 640, 643 (1981).
Id. at 644-45.
35
Id. at 647.
36
Id. at 648.
37
Id.
38
Id.
34
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applied evenhandedly to all who wished to distribute or sell
materials.39
Second, the Court found that the regulation served a significant
governmental interest. The State had an interest in maintaining the
“orderly movement of the crowd given the large number of exhibitors
and persons attending the Fair.”40 Given the high attendance of fairgoers, State’s interest in crowd control by confining distribution,
selling, and solicitation activities to fixed locations served a substantial
state interest.41
Third, the Court found that ISKCON members had alternative
channels for their religious expressions. The ISKON members could
distribute or sell materials in the area outside of the fairgrounds, or
orally propagate their views inside the fair and point fairgoers to the
fixed locations where they could distribute or sell materials.42 The
Court noted that the State Fair was a limited-public forum with the
purpose of allowing the greatest number of exhibitors to present their
products or views and that the regulation requiring that exhibitors do
so from fixed locations did not limit their ability to share their views.43
Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in Heffron,
asserting that the State Fair regulation prohibiting the distribution of
materials was not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest.44
Justice Brennan joined the majority in finding that the State Fair’s
prohibition on sales and solicitations was constitutional, but he found
that the State Fair’s ban on distributing literature was not narrowly
tailored to serve the government’s interest in crowd control.45 Justice
Brennan found that because the governmental regulation infringed on
ISKCON members’ First Amendment rights, the regulation must be
narrowly tailored to further a legitimate interest.46 If the State’s major
39

Id.
Id. at 649-50.
41
Id. at 654-55.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 655.
44
Id. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45
Id.
46
Id. at 658.
40
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concern was to avoid congestion and control crowds, then the
regulation could have been more narrowly tailored to prohibit the
distribution of literature by ISKCON at fairground points, such as
entrances and exits, where congestion would occur.47 Justice Brennan
concluded that because distributing literature was essential for
ISKCON members’ religious expression, the State could have drafted
a narrower rule that protected its interest in crowd control while
respecting ISKCON member’s First Amendment rights.48
Several years after Heffron in 1990, the Court encountered
another regulation prohibiting solicitations. In United States v.
Kokinda, the Court upheld a United States Postal Service regulation
that prohibited “soliciting alms and contributions” and “commercial
soliciting and vending” on postal premises.49 In that case, members of
the National Democratic Policy Committee (NDPC) set up a table on
the sidewalk near the only entrance to the Bowie, Maryland Post
Office to solicit contributions and sell books and subscriptions related
to their organization.50 During the several hours that the NDPC were
outside the post office, postal employees received between 40 and 50
complaints regarding their presence.51 When the postmaster asked the
NDPC members to leave, the members refused and were subsequently
arrested.52 A United States Magistrate Judge convicted the NDPC
members of violating the postal service regulation prohibiting
solicitations on postal premises.53 The convicted NDPC members
appealed, asserting that the postal service’s regulation violated their
First Amendment rights.54
The Court held that solicitation is a form of speech that is
protected by the First Amendment, but that the postal service
regulation was a valid content-neutral speech restriction under the
47

Id. at 662.
Id. at 663.
49
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 724 (1990).
50
Id. at 723.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 723-24.
53
Id. at 724
54
Id.
48
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First Amendment.55 Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, found
that the sidewalk outside of the post office was not a traditional public
forum and thus, applied a test of reasonableness.56 The postal
regulation did not suppress speech based on content because all groups
were excluded from engaging in solicitation.57 Furthermore, the
restriction was reasonable to prevent disruptions in post office
business and impediments to the normal flow of traffic into and out of
the post office.58 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, agreed
with the plurality’s holding except as to the post office’s status as a
traditional public forum.59 Justice Kennedy found that the sidewalk
was not a traditional forum to accommodate speech and thus any
restrictions on speech must be valid time, place, and manner
restrictions.60 In this case, Justice Kennedy concluded that the post
office’s regulation was a valid time, place, and manner restriction.61
Justice Brennan, joined by the three remaining justices, wrote a
dissenting opinion in which he found that the sidewalk outside of the
post office was a public forum and that the postal service regulation
was not a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.62
Citing a string of cases, Justice Brennan found that the sidewalk was a
public forum or at the very least, a limited-purpose public forum.63
Justice Brennan noted that content-based speech restrictions in a
public or limited-purpose public forum must be narrowly drawn to
serve a compelling governmental interest.64 Contrary to Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion, the dissent found that the postal
service regulation was not content-neutral because the restriction was
tied explicitly to the content of the speech.65 Because a person on
55

Id. at 722.
Id. at 730.
57
Id. at 736.
58
Id. at 733-34.
59
Id. at 737-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
60
Id. at 738.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 740 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63
Id. at 743-52.
64
Id. at 752.
65
Id. at 753.
56
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postal premises may say, “Please support my political advocacy
group” but may not say, “Please contribute $10,” the restriction was
content-based.66 Because the regulation is based on the concern that
asking for money embarrasses or annoys the post-office-goer, the
regulation is based on the content of the speech.67 Furthermore, Justice
Brennan noted that the regulation prohibits all solicitation anywhere
on postal service property, which “sweeps an entire category of
expressive activity off of a public forum solely in the interest of
administrative convenience.”68 Therefore, Justice Brennan found that
the absolute prohibition on solicitation did not permit solicitation at
any time or any place in the forum and thus was not a valid restriction
that was narrowly tailored.69
Two years after the decision in Kokinda, the Court upheld
another regulation prohibiting solicitations because it found that the
regulation was a reasonable restriction.70 In International Society for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, the Court upheld a Port Authority
regulation that prohibited the sale or distribution of merchandise,
flyers, or other written material, and the solicitation and receipt of
funds in a “repetitive manner.”71 The Court first found that the Port
Authority did not constitute a traditional public forum because airports
and terminals like the Port Authority have never been traditionally
used to promote freedom of expression, and the Port Authority’s
purpose was not to promote expression but to facilitate travel.72 Thus,
because the Port Authority was not a traditional public forum, the Port
Authority could regulate solicitation as long as the regulation was
reasonable.73 The Court held that it is reasonable to regulate
solicitations in order to avoid disruptive effects, inconveniences, and
risks of duress for passengers traveling in the terminals.74 The Court
66

Id.
Id. at 754.
68
Id. at 753.
69
Id. at 755.
70
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 675-77 (1992).
71
Id. at 675-77.
72
Id. at 682-83.
73
Id. at 683.
74
Id. at 684-85.
67
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noted in particular that “face-to-face solicitation presents risks of
duress that are an appropriate target of regulation.”75
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, disagreed with the
majority’s finding in Lee that the airport terminal was not a public
forum.76 Justice Kennedy found that the airport was a public forum,
but that the airport’s blanket prohibition on in-person solicitations of
money for immediate payment was narrow and a valid regulation on
time, place, and manner of protected speech.77 Justice Kennedy argued
that this ban on solicitations was directed at abusive practices and not
any message or idea in particular, making this ban a content-neutral
speech restriction.78 He also noted that conduct such as an immediate
exchange for money implicates issues related to fraud and duress on
those passing by in a way that allows the Port Authority to regulate
it.79 Finally, Justice Kennedy stated that this ban left open alternative
channels of communication because solicitors could explain their
cause and request later payments through prepaid envelopes.80
In Kokinda and Lee, the Court’s holding depended on whether
the forum was considered a public forum. The plurality in Kokinda
found that the sidewalk outside the post office was not a public forum
and applied the more lenient reasonableness test.81 Similarly, in Lee,
the Court found that the Port Authority was not a traditional public
forum and applied the same reasonableness test to the regulation.82
The Court upheld both regulations as valid speech restrictions under
the reasonableness test.83 The concurring and dissenting opinions in
Kokinda,84 and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lee,85
however, found that the forums in question were public forums or
75

Id. at 684.
Id. at 694 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77
Id. at 705.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 705-06.
80
Id. at 707.
81
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990).
82
Lee, 505 U.S. at 683.
83
Id. at 755; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 722.
84
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 737-38, 740.
85
Lee, 505 U.S. at 684.
76
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limited-public forums. In both cases, Justice Kennedy found that the
regulation was content-neutral and a valid time, place, and manner
restriction.86 However, Justice Brennan in the dissenting opinion of
Kokinda disagreed and found the regulation to be content-based and
thus must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, which the regulation was not.87 The outcome of the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Kokinda and Lee depended on
whether the restriction was classified as content-based or contentneutral.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING RESTRICTIONS ON
PANHANDLING
Relying on these Supreme Court opinions, many federal
circuits in recent years have reviewed restrictions on panhandling. In
their analyses of regulations on panhandling, the federal circuits have
disagreed on whether such restrictions on panhandling are contentbased or content-neutral speech restrictions.
For example, in Iskcon of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a National Park
Service regulation on solicitation, distribution, and sales of goods on
the National Mall as a content-neutral restriction.88 In Iskcon of
Potomac, the Park Service regulation at issue prohibited, in relevant
part, “soliciting or demanding gifts, money, goods or services.”89 The
regulation defined solicitation to include only an in-person request for
immediate payment.90 The court found that this solicitation prohibition
was a content-neutral restriction because it did not regulate a type of
expression or a specific message but instead regulated the manner in
which the message could be conveyed.91 The court, citing Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lee, found that regulating in-person
86

Id. at 738; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 705.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 753.
88
61 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
89
Id. at 954.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 955.
87
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solicitations regulated the manner in which a message was conveyed,
not the specific message itself.92 The D.C. Circuit next addressed
whether the regulation was narrowly tailored. The court found that the
regulation was not narrowly tailored because it substantially burdened
more speech than necessary to achieve its interest in preserving the
quality of experience for the visitors in the National Mall.93
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in ACLU v. City of Las Vegas
struck down an ordinance banning solicitation in Las Vegas’s
downtown area.94 Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that
the ban on solicitation was a content-based ordinance.95 Although
there was no content-based purpose behind the ordinance, the Ninth
Circuit found that the ordinance on its face discriminated based on
content.96 The ordinance defined solicitation as “to ask, beg, solicitor
plead, whether orally or in a written or printed manner for the purpose
of obtaining money, charity, business or patronage, or gifts or items of
value for oneself or another person or organization.”97 Because the
ordinance had the primary effect of suppressing or exalting speech of
certain content, the court held that the ordinance was content-based.98
The court stated that when an ordinance is content-based, it is
presumptively invalid and will only be constitutional if the
government can demonstrate that it is the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest.99 The Ninth Circuit, like
the D.C. Circuit, recognized that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lee
addressed this issue. The Ninth Circuit held that because the ordinance
did not ban the act of solicitation but instead banned messages that
contain soliciting content, the ordinance was content-based.100 Thus,
as a content-based restriction, the ordinance was subject to strict
92

Id.
Id. at 956.
94
466 F.3d 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2006).
95
Id. at 793.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 788.
98
Id. at 793.
99
Id. at 792.
100
Id. at 796.
93
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scrutiny review.101 The Ninth Circuit struck down the ordinance
because the City conceded that “even the peaceful, unobstructive
distribution of handbills requesting future support” would be
prohibited, and thus the ordinance could not survive strict scrutiny.102
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Clatterbuck v. City of
Charlottesville struck down a municipal ordinance that made it
unlawful for any person to solicit money or sell goods within fifty feet
of a main downtown intersection.103 The ordinance defined solicitation
as “to request an immediate donation of money or other thing of value
from another person, regardless of the solicitor’s purpose or intended
use of the money or other thing of value.”104 The Fourth Circuit
applied the analysis from its own prior case, Brown v. Town of
Cary,105 which held that a restriction is content-based if it
distinguishes content “with a censorial intent to value some forms of
speech over others” and restricts speech because the government
disagrees with the message or ideas.106 Because the ordinance
prevented a solicitor’s speech when it involved immediate donations
of things of value but allowed other types of solicitations, such as
requests for future donations or things that have no value, the
ordinance was based on the content of the solicitor’s speech.107 After
determining that the ordinance involved a content-based speech
restriction, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case back to the district
court to determine the governmental interests in enforcing the
ordinance.108
Within six months of Clatterbuck, the Sixth Circuit also struck
down a Michigan statute that made it unlawful for a person to be
found begging in a public place.109 The Sixth Circuit found that the
Michigan anti-begging statute violated the First Amendment because it
101

Id. at 797.
Id.
103
708 F.3d 549, 552 (4th Cir. 2013).
104
Id.
105
706 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2013).
106
Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 560.
109
Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013).
102
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was overbroad.110 The statute did not clarify what constituted begging.
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit, worried about the chilling effect if left on
the books, struck down the anti-begging statute.111
More recently, however, in Thayer v. City of Worcester, the
First Circuit reviewed and upheld a Worcester city ordinance, the
Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance.112 The Aggressive Panhandling
Ordinance made it unlawful for any person to beg, panhandle or solicit
any other person in an aggressive manner.113 The First Circuit first
inquired as to whether the government adopted these ordinances
restricting speech because the government disagreed with the message
that the speech conveyed.114 The First Circuit determined that the
ordinance was not content-based because the ordinances do not
identify speech except by reference to the behavior, time, or location
of its delivery.115 The First Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lee to find that certain in-person requests for immediate
money could create a risk of fraud and duress.116 Finding that the
ordinance was content-neutral, the First Circuit applied the
intermediate level of scrutiny.117 Under intermediate scrutiny, the
speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental purpose while leaving open adequate alternative
channels of communication.118 The First Circuit found that the
appellants failed to provide evidence showing that the ordinances were
overbroad.119 As such, the ordinances were upheld as valid restrictions
on speech.

110

Id. at 880.
Id. at 878.
112
755 F.3d at 64.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 67.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 69.
117
Id. at 71.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 71-73.
111

456
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015

15

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

III. NORTON V. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD
In September of 2014, the Seventh Circuit upheld a City of
Springfield ordinance prohibiting panhandling.120 The ordinance
provided that it is “unlawful to engage in an act of panhandling in the
downtown historic district.”121 The ordinance defined panhandling as
an oral request for immediate donation of money.122 The court noted
that because panhandling was defined as an oral request, signs
requesting money and oral requests to send money later were
allowable under the ordinance.123 The downtown historic district is a
small portion of the city area but comprises the city’s principal
shopping, entertainment, and governmental areas.124
Plaintiffs, Don Norton and Karen Otterson, received citations
for violating this ordinance.125 Plaintiffs feared that further citations
would result if they continued to panhandle and filed suit in the district
court for a preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of the
ordinance.126 Plaintiffs alleged that Springfield’s panhandling
prohibition violated the First Amendment.127 In the district court, the
parties agreed that panhandling is a form of speech that receives First
Amendment protections.128 The parties also agreed that if this
ordinance drew lines based on the content of the speech, the ordinance
would be unconstitutional.129 The district court denied plaintiff’s
preliminary injunction, finding that the ordinance was contentneutral.130

120

Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2014).
Springfield Municipal Code § 131.06(e).
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In reviewing the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit
first looked to its previous cases on this matter.131 Although the court
encountered a prior case with similar facts in Gresham v. Peterson,132
the question of whether anti-panhandling ordinances were contentbased or content-neutral was not presented in that case.133 Also, the
Seventh Circuit noted the existing circuit split that exists with regards
to this question.
To determine whether the ordinance in Norton constituted a
content-based speech restriction, the Seventh Circuit held that
regulations are content-based when the regulation restricts speech
because of the message or idea that it conveys or when the government
disapproves of the message.134 The court stated that restrictions on
panhandling do not fall into either one of those categories because the
City is not restricting an idea or message or disapproving of said idea
or message. Because the ordinance is indifferent to the purposes, if
any, behind the solicitor’s appeal for money, the ordinance is not
content-based.135 Instead, panhandlers are able to use signs, which are
less threatening than oral requests, and still convey their message and
have access to the marketplace of ideas.136 Citing to Justice Kennedy’s
decision in Lee, the Seventh Circuit held that the regulation was
narrowly tailored so that it dealt only with “potentially threatening”
confrontations.137 The Seventh Circuit upheld the ordinance, finding
that it was content-neutral and a permissible time, place, and manner
restriction by the City.138
Judge Manion wrote a dissenting opinion in which he held that
the ordinance was a content-based regulation that was subject to strict
131

Id.
225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000).
133
Norton, 768 F.3d at 714. (citing Gresham, 225 F.3d at 899 (upholding an
anti-panhandling ordinance in Indianapolis but not addressing the issue of contentbased restrictions because the parties agreed that it was content-based)).
134
Id. at 717.
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scrutiny.139 Judge Manion distinguished this case from the Supreme
Court cases of Lee, Kokinda, and Heffron by noting that each of the
latter cases dealt with governmental restrictions on all forms of
solicitation.140 The ordinance at issue, however, only restricted
immediate oral requests for money.141 Furthermore, as for the circuit
split, Judge Manion believed that the Seventh Circuit took “the path
less-traveled” when it joined the D.C. Circuit and the First Circuit in
finding that the restrictions were content-neutral.142
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Manion distinguished Norton
from the cases holding that panhandling statutes were constitutional.
Judge Manion found that the ordinance in Thayer from the First
Circuit differed because it targeted aggressive or repeated solicitations
for money.143 The ordinance only made it unlawful for a person to
repeatedly solicit money.144 Because the Springfield ordinance made
all oral requests for money unlawful, the ordinance in Thayer was
more permissive than the Springfield ordinance and thus should not
have been followed by the Seventh Circuit.145In addition, Judge
Manion dismissed the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Kennedy because he
believed that the D.C. Circuit misapplied the law.146
Moreover, Judge Manion suggested a new approach to
determining whether a restriction is content-based. He suggested that
the court “temporarily step into the shoes of the City’s enforcement
authorities.”147 Under this ordinance, an enforcement authority must
“listen to what the speaker is saying in order to determine whether the
speaker violated the ordinance.”148 The authorities must discern three
things from the speech: first, whether the speech is a request for
money (potentially a violation) or a request for the listener’s time,
139

Id. at 718 (Manion, J. dissenting).
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signature, or labor (not a violation); second, whether the speech is a
request for an immediate transfer of money (potentially a violation) or
merely a request for the transfer of money at a future date (not a
violation); third, whether the speech is a request for a charitable
donation (potentially a violation) or a request for commercial
transaction (not a violation).149Judge Manion found that because the
authorities cannot determine if there is a violation of the ordinance
without listening to and understanding what the speaker is saying, the
ordinance is content-based.150 In his analysis, Judge Manion stated that
the ordinance could not be content-neutral, as the majority held,
because the ordinance did not impose a restriction based on the
volume, location, or conduct accompanying the speech.151
In his dissent, Judge Manion stated that the Springfield
ordinance prohibiting panhandling was a content-based speech
restriction that was subject to strict scrutiny review.152 Thus, because
the City did not prove that the ordinance meets strict scrutiny review,
Judge Manion dissented from the majority and held that the ordinance
was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.153
IV. ARGUMENT
In Norton, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly characterized the
City of Springfield’s ordinance prohibiting panhandling in the
downtown historic district as a content-neutral speech restriction.154
The Seventh Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s precedent and
departed from the decisions of its sister circuits. The Supreme Court
cases on solicitation have limited application because (1) the
149
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Id. at 723.
153
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154
The issue is whether the ordinance in Norton is a content-neutral or contentbased restriction on protected speech. The parties agreed that panhandling is a form
of charitable solicitation that is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 714
(majority opinion).
150
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downtown area in Norton is a traditional public forum, and (2) the
ordinance in Norton regulates specific content rather than conduct.
First, the downtown historic area in Norton is a traditional
public forum.155 The Court in Heffron, Kokinda, and Lee, applied a
more lenient test because the state fairgrounds, the post-office
sidewalk, and the Port Authority terminals, respectively, were not
traditional public forums.156 But, because the downtown historic area
is a public forum, any speech restrictions must pass a more rigorous
standard—they must be a valid time, place, manner restriction that is
narrowly tailored.157
Second, the regulations in Heffron, Kokinda, and Lee were
broadly applicable to anyone looking to solicit in the area. In Heffron,
the state fair regulation prohibited anyone from distributing or selling
flyers, literature, or other written works in the fairgrounds unless it
was from a fixed location.158 Likewise, in Kokinda, the post office
regulation prohibited anyone from soliciting contributions on postoffice grounds.159 Similarly, in Lee, the Port Authority regulation
prohibited the soliciting and receipt of funds in a repetitive manner.160
All three of these regulations applied to anyone looking to solicit and
receive funds, regardless of the cause or reason for the solicitation.
However, in Norton, the City ordinance specifically targeted oral
requests for immediate donation of money.161 The ordinance singled
out a specific type of message, for a specific cause, and linked to a
particular group—the needy and the homeless. The Supreme Court has
stated that speech restrictions are content based when the speech
restriction has “the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a
155

Id. at 715.
See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
655 (1981) (finding that the State Fair is limited-public forum); United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (finding that the post-office sidewalk is not a
traditional public forum); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 682-83 (1992) (finding that the Port Authority is not a traditional public forum).
157
See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 740.
158
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 643.
159
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 724.
160
Lee, 505 U.S. at 675-77.
161
Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2014).
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particular point of view.”162 Unlike the regulations in Heffron,
Kokinda, and Lee, the ordinance in Norton does not prohibit all
solicitations in order to advance a governmental interest but instead
targets one specific type of speech based on its content of requesting
immediate donations of money.
As for the existing circuit split on panhandling regulations, as
Judge Manion noted in his dissent, the Seventh Circuit did depart from
its sister circuits in upholding the Springfield ordinance. Only one of
the five circuit courts has upheld a regulation on panhandling—the
First Circuit in Thayer.163 As Judge Manion noted, the ordinance in
Thayer is different from the ordinance in Norton because the
ordinance in Thayer specifically applied to repeated solicitations.164
The ordinance in Norton is more similar to those in ACLU and
Clatterbuck. Both of those cases determined that restrictions on
panhandling are content-based and invalid under the First
Amendment.165 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Clatterbuck, regulations
are content-based when they distinguish content “with a censorial
intent to value some forms of speech over others.”166
Many of the federal circuits in deciding this issue have cited to
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lee. However, Justice Kennedy’s
concurring decision also has limited application to this case. Justice
Kennedy argued that prohibitions directed at abusive practices were
content-neutral because such prohibitions regulated conduct and not
content.167 The regulation in Lee regulated abusive practices because it
prohibited “repetitive” solicitations for funds inside the terminals.168 In
Norton, however, the ordinance prohibited any oral requests for
money,169 which is not directed at conduct like the prohibition in Lee,
162

Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648.
755 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2014).
164
768 F.3d at 720 (Manion, J., dissenting).
165
See ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2006);
Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2013).
166
Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556.
167
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 705 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
168
Id.
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Norton, 768 F.3d at 714.
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but rather at the type of oral message. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence provided that there were alternative channels for those
looking to solicit funds such as explaining their message and
requesting money later.170 However, Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion does not take into account that some solicitations for money
cannot be received later, such as when the person is homeless or
simply cannot wait for funds. His suggestion of prepaid envelopes
might be an alternative channel for organizations and business looking
to solicit funds but not for an individual looking for spare change to
survive.
Instead, the Seventh Circuit should have considered Justice
Brennan’s dissent in Kokinda. Justice Brennan explained that the
postal service regulation was content-based because under the
restriction, a person on postal premises could say, “Please support my
political advocacy group” but could not say, “Please contribute
$10.”171 He further explained that the regulation singled out this type
of speech because it had the tendency to embarrass or annoy the postoffice-goer, which made it a content-based restriction.172 Along similar
lines as Justice Brennan’s dissent, Judge Manion’s dissent stated that
singling out a specific type of speech is content-based. Because the
violation occurs as a result of the content of the words spoken—that
the words are oral requests for the immediate donation of money—the
ordinance in Norton is a content-based speech restriction.173
The ordinance in Norton is a content-based speech restriction
that should have been subject to strict scrutiny review. The Seventh
Circuit erred in deciding that the ordinance regulated conduct instead
of content. The ordinance singles out one type of solicitation and
unequivocally silences this type of solicitation simply because of its
content. Instead of banning all solicitation in the downtown area, the
City of Springfield has only targeted those solicitations that are most
likely linked to the homeless and the needy. In its decision, the
Seventh Circuit silenced the voices of a group in one stroke of
170

Id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
172
Id. at 754.
173
Norton, 768 F.3d at 721 (Manion, J., dissenting).
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categorization simply because the public disagrees or finds it difficult
to listen to the message of that group.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold a Springfield
ordinance that prohibits panhandling in the downtown area has
deprived a particular group of its ability to contribute their ideas and
messages. Although the Supreme Court has yet to review any
regulations on panhandling, the Supreme Court has upheld several
regulations on solicitations. The Seventh Circuit misapplied the
Supreme Court’s framework for determining when a restriction is
content-based and content-neutral. In finding that the Springfield
ordinance is content-neutral, the Seventh Circuit departed from its
sister circuits. Because the ordinance is based on the content and the
ideas of the speech, the ordinance is content-based and should not
have been upheld without a compelling governmental interest that is
narrowly tailored. To otherwise silence an entire category of speech,
as the Seventh Circuit did, is to violate the First Amendment and
deprive an already underrepresented group—the homeless and the
needy—of their constitutional rights.
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